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Introduction
‘Biobanking’ essentially involves the procurement and storage of
human genetic materials and their use for research and therapeutic
purposes. This paper is about the actual and potential development of
an ethics that is adequate and appropriate to the practice and institu-
tions of biobanking, the question being how best to develop a frame-
work within which the relevant ethical questions are first identified and
then addressed in the right ways. One way to approach this question
is to consider the ways in which the usual standard approach in
bioethics, that of informed consent, is an inadequate ethical frame-
work for biobanking. In biobanking the individual donor must relin-
quish a degree of control over the way their material is used in these
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En busca de un marco efectivo
para los biobancos
RESUMEN:Este artículo habla del desarrollo actual y
potencial de una ética adecuada para las prácticas
y las instituciones de los biobancos. Necesitamos de
un sistema en que se puedan reconocer las cues-
tiones éticas más relevantes y en que estas cues-
tiones se puedan contestar en el modo mejor. La
actitud típica de la bioética – fundada sobre el prin-
cipio de la autonomía personal que se puede respe-
tar con el consentimiento informado – no es una
actitud adecuada a los biobancos. Cuando una per-
sona dona sus muestras genéticas a un biobanco,
pierde parcialmente control y no siempre sabe
cómo las muestras se utilizan en proyectos de in-
vestigación largos y abiertos. La identificación de la
naturaleza de las muestras genéticas permite que
también otras personas – no solamente el donante
– tengan intereses y derechos que deben ser con-
siderados. El artículo reflexiona sobre las limitacio-
nes del modelo del consentimiento informado y
después discute tres modelos alternativos que
están emergiendo en el contexto de los biobancos.
Estos modelos conceptualizan el tema de la ética de
los biobancos de manera diferente, concentrándose
en los aspectos cooperativos y comunitarios. En la
primera versión los participantes en la investigación
son como accionistas. En la segunda la participa-
ción incluye a todos los que obtienen ventajas por
medio de los biobancos. Al final, se introduce la ter-
cera versión en que la institución de los biobancos
es conceptualizada como un sujeto ético que puede
contribuir a direccionar y evaluar sus propias acti-
vidades.
PALABRAS-CLAVE: biobancos; ética; autonomía;
consentimiento; cooperación; accionistas.
ABSTRACT: This paper is about the actual and po-
tential development of an ethics that is appropriate
to the practices and institutions of biobanking, the
question being how best to develop a framework
within which the relevant ethical questions are first
identified and then addressed in the right ways. It
begins with ways in which a standard approach in
bioethics – namely upholding a principle of indivi-
dual autonomy via the practice of gaining donors’
informed consent – is an inadequate ethical frame-
work for biobanking. In donating material to a
biobank, the individual donor relinquishes a degree
of control and knowledge over the way their mate-
rial is used in large-scale and typically open ended
projects; and the identifying nature of genetic ma-
terial means that third parties have rights and in-
terests which must be taken into account as well as
those of the individual donor. After discussing the
problems for informed consent in the biobanking
context, the paper then considers three emerging
alternative approaches which, broadly speaking,
conceptualize the subject of biobanking ethics in
communal or co-operative terms: one version sees
participants in biobanking research as ‘sharehold-
ers’ whilst the other expands on the notion of par-
ticipation to include the wider public beneficiaries of
biobanking as ‘stakeholders’. It concludes by out-
lining a third view, on which the biobanking institu-
tion itself is conceived as an ethical subject whose
defining function can do useful normative work in
guiding and evaluating its activities.
KEYWORDS: biobanking; ethics; autonomy;
consent; cooperative; stakeholder.
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typically large-scale and open ended projects. Moreover, the identifying
nature of genetic material means that third parties have rights and in-
terests which must be taken into account as well as those of the indi-
vidual donor. Thus whilst informed consent is used to protect personal
autonomy and rights in most areas of bioethics, its efficacy as a single
or primary guiding principle in the case of biobanking is challenged.
Accordingly, the paper begins by discussing the bioethical primacy of in-
dividual autonomy via its focus on donors’ ‘informed consent’ and the
problems with this in the context of biobanking. It then considers three
emerging approaches to biobanking ethics which, broadly speaking,
conceptualizes the subject of biobanking ethics in communal or co-
operative terms: one version sees participants in biobanking research
as ‘shareholders’ whilst the other expands on the notion of participation
to include the wider public beneficiaries of biobanking as ‘stakeholders’.
The paper concludes by outlining a third view, on which the bioban-
king institution itself is conceived as an ethical subject whose defining
function can do useful normative work in guiding and evaluating its ac-
tivities.
1. Individual Autonomy and Informed Consent
Let us start with the notion of informed consent and the reasons for its
employment in the ethics of medical research.
Making informed consent as a necessary condition of research reflects
a primary concern with the autonomy of persons: the condition under
which individuals exercise their will and make choices for themselves
(literally ‘a law unto oneself’). In the case of research and bioethics
there are good reasons why autonomy is ranked so highly as an ethi-
cal ideal. A key reason for the development of a research ethics in the
first place was the protection of the research subject from research
projects that may compromise individual autonomy or, in extreme cir-
cumstances, destroy it altogether. We can chart the urgency of this con-
cern at least as far back as the Nuremberg Code of research ethics,
developed as a list of principles that specify the conditions under which
research could and could not be carried out on humans. As well as sta-
ting that ‘[t]he voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely
essential’, the code’s first principle also explicitly adds that the subject
must have ‘made known to him the nature, duration, and purpose of
the experiment (1949).
Whilst the insistence on voluntary consent alone rules out the commis-
sion of certain acts of bodily harm or violation against the individual
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person, thus protecting autonomy to some extent, informed consent
pursues autonomy in at least two further and important senses. Firstly,
by relating to conditions of privacy as well as harm, the information
condition recognizes the way in which an individual can be wronged
without necessarily being harmed in any physical or even psychologi-
cal sense. Voluntarily consenting to give parts of oneself to medical
science does not itself entail giving away to anyone all (or any) of the
personal information that can be derived from those parts. And whilst
bodily materials such as DNA or blood samples are, once donated,
usually alienated from the subject at least in the sense of being un-
connected to their immediate psycho-physical well being,1 what hap-
pens to that material after donation can be construed as an invasion of
the donor’s privacy that violates their autonomy.2 Secondly, where a
concern for individual privacy can be seen as embodying individual au-
tonomy in terms of protection from potential abuses by others, it also
reflects a positive ‘freedom to’ sense by which the individual donor is
positively enabled to make certain choices regarding themselves and
their interests. When the future usage of genetic material and infor-
mation is included as one such interest, informed consent of donors in
research can be understood as serving the value of autonomy in both
the protective and the enabling senses.
We should be careful to note here that this prioritization of individual
autonomy begets a particular ‘liberal-individualist’ view of the person as
a singular and discrete unit of ethical focus. Any approach to ethics
takes individuals to be its subject some sense: a thoroughly classical
utilitarianism, for example, certainly counts the well-being of indivi-
duals. It is precisely by adding together these units and observing the
resulting sum of harms against welfare that the utilitarian view can war-
rant the erosion of one or more individual persons’ autonomy – to the
disquiet of some of its critics. By contrast, the liberal individualist view
does not allow, and actively seeks to disallow, this erosion.
One reason, then, that research ethics and bioethics has ‘reified the in-
dividual and individual autonomy’ (Koenig, 2001, 33) can be linked to
its focus on what gave rise to the sub-discipline of ethics in the first
place: on the relation of individual subjects to the practices and pro-
jects of medical research. Consider that a plausible and attractive sin-
gle principle of non-malificence – of doing no harm – could certainly be
evoked to protect individual research subjects from psycho-physical
abuses and harms, and this could be combined with a variety of utili-
tarianism which sought to maximise future public health, for example.
But this could also leave untouched both the wronging of privacy inva-
sion and the possibility of preventing important personal choices which
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individual autonomy circumscribe. Accordingly this perceived indis-
pensability of autonomy, or at least its importance, in bioethics3 can be
mapped by a trend towards a ‘principlism’4 of autonomy in bioethics.
Historically, bioethics grew out of a professional ethic in which the pri-
mary concern has been the relationship between the medical doctor
and the patient. Accordingly a particular concern has been to protect
the confidentiality of the patient and maintain trust between doctor and
patient (Widdows, 2009). To this original professional ethic additional
concerns have been added, such as those of research ethics and
public health, however, these professional roots goes some way to ex-
plain the importance of patient confidentiality as ‘one of the most im-
portant principles of medical ethics’ (Harris, 1985, 225).
Correspondingly, donors’ informed consent can be seen as playing much
the same role as in research ethics as patient confidentiality has done
in medical ethics.
Problems with Autonomy and informed Consent
A fundamental criticism of the liberal-individual view is that its focus
on individual autonomy is founded on an unsatisfactory conception of
the person as a responsible and moral being. As formulated variously
by communitarian, feminist and virtue ethical views among others; this
objection claims that the idea that persons can be individuated, in the
way that that liberal-individualism requires, rests on a mistake. What,
these theorists ask, does such a discrete individual amount to if they
are supposed to be a ‘person that exists independently of, and able
freely to choose, the ends that give her life meaning and value?’ (Mul-
hall and Swift, 1996, 13).5 On this account the self – a person with
values, decisions, projects and character – is necessarily made up of
and inseparable from a social world of other such selves: a world
without which the meaning of these features of ourselves would prove
elusive. To underline this criticism perhaps, we can ask rhetorically
whether one could intelligibly make a ‘fully informed’ decision about
one’s own action if it were based only on one’s own directives chosen
in isolation from those of others. What would such autonomous choices
and actions be like? And, granting for the sake of argument that these
choices and actions were possible, why would we want persons to be
like this? Continuing with this objection, the liberal individualist’s nor-
mative error, then, is to direct ethical attention to a supposedly isolated
individual person that is not really a living ethical subject.
A defendant of the liberal individualist view could respond to this criticism
by saying that they are not in fact committed to such a metaphysical ‘ato-
mist’ view of the individual. They can agree that individual moral per-
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sonhood is necessarily socially constituted and maintained, and agree that
this is a good thing, but at the same time maintain the primary value of au-
tonomy. Whilst it may make no sense to see individual selves and choices
as operating within discretely autonomous bubbles, it could yet make all the
sense in the world to make individuals, as rights-bearers and beings with
interests, the primary focus of our ethical principles. Understanding the
human being descriptively as essentially a social or a political animal is per-
fectly compatible with articulating and defending a normative conception of
individual and inalienable human rights, for example. Accordingly some ‘re-
lational’ accounts of autonomy have urged that certain social relations are
at least necessary for persons to make autonomous actions and choices
(Christman, 2004; Mackenzie and Stoljar, 2000).6
However, although the liberal individualist may be able to defend their
normative view, and whilst autonomy may rightly remain a key value
in bioethics, the practice of storing and using genetic material and in-
formation problematizes informed consent in biobanking and unsettles
individual autonomy’s status as a guiding principle of ethics in the case
of biobanking, as we will see next.
With respect to the privacy and confidentiality conditions circumscribed
by informed consent, a basic problem is that the genetic material that
an individual donates contains information not only about the donor but
also about other people, such that ‘disclosure of genetic information by
individual DNA donors also exposes information about others with si-
milar genetic profiles’ (Mitchell and Happe, 2001, 376). Groups of re-
levant others can include biological families or whole communities with
similar ethnic or social backgrounds (Brock, 2001, 34), and in the con-
text of biobanking projects and overall goals, it is this kind of collective
information which biobanks are, typically seeking to make use of, by
identifying genetic tendencies and reactions etc. Now recall that, in the
present context, the ‘informed’ in informed consent includes being told
about future usage and disclosure about how one’s genetic material and
information is to be used. If an essential aspect of the autonomy con-
dition is that it is meant to preserve the interests of individuals and to
prevent them being harmed, and a piece of genetic material provides
information about many individuals’ interests and ways in which they
may be harmed (for example information about a tendency towards a
certain disease), then adhering to the individual donor’s informed con-
sent fails with regard to the autonomy of the relevant others.
An obvious concern here is that informing and securing the informed
consent of all relevant individual parties is practically problematic or
impossible. But there is an important conceptual sense in which the
focus on individual autonomy misses the ethical target here as well.
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How can one individual (or even a number of individuals less than the
total in the relevant group or populace) consent to the usage of some-
thing widely and communally shared? The problem is most clearly
exemplified in the case of genomic research carried out on the indige-
nous Haghai tribe of Papua New Guinea in 1994. Here a patent was
granted on a cell line containing unmodified Hagahai DNA which had
been collected from a small number of individuals. The material was to
be used for detecting HTLV-1-related retroviruses, the longer term ob-
jective being a diagnostic tool or vaccine for certain types of leukaemia.
This patent was ‘disclaimed’ in 1996 but the Hagahai cell line remains
in the public domain at the American Type Culture Collection as ATCC
Number: CRL-10528 Organism: Homo Sapiens (human) at a cost of
$290 per sample. (Widdows, 2009, 179) The study, and others like, it
was heavily criticized on a number of grounds, not least for the per-
ceived biological imperialism of garnering the DNA of an indigenous
community for possibly lucrative Western research projects. For our
purposes we can clearly see that in this case, ticking the individual
donors’ informed consent box neither gained the relevant consent nor
gave the relevant information to the persons or community concerned.
The problem here is that by adhering to the informed consent of donors’
condition, as if this was doing all the ethical work, individuals ended up un-
knowingly giving ‘permission’ to use genetic information about a whole peo-
ple that had not consented. But the Haghai case and others like it also
exemplifies a more general feature of biobanking in relation to individual
consent and autonomy. ‘Whereas clinical research has specific aims, the aims
of biobank research may be vague or non-existent at the time of the parti-
cipants’ donation to the biobank.’ (Skolbekken et al., 2005, 336). That is, the
nature of biobanking is that its projects are open-ended and possibly as yet
undecided, thus at least some of its activities may be unforeseen. Thus a
donor to a biobank must in some sense consent to their genetic information
being used in such unforeseen ways, and this immediately presents a ques-
tion as to whether their consent can be informed in the sense thought to
preserve their individual autonomy: about which more in the next section.
Hence, where there has been good reason to employ informed consent
– in service to the conception of individual autonomy – as the corner-
stone of an adequate medical ethics and bioethics, there now appears
an inadequacy of that conception in certain cases of genetic research,
most conspicuously in biobanking. The defining activities of biobanking
and the nature of their projects call into question the extent, if any, to
which a principle of personal autonomy can do the right ethical work re-
quired in governing and guiding biobanking practices. Genetic informa-
tion given by donors is typically about a number of persons, and the
HEATHER WIDDOWS & SEAN CORDELL
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uses to which it may be put are not specifiable in a way that fits the au-
tonomy respecting aspects of informed consent.
To be clear, the point is not that biobanking necessarily involves and
affects large numbers of individuals and aims at wider societal goods
and so, therefore, biobanking ethics needs to modify its ethical outlook
in order to be practically efficient and achieve its goals, for example.
(Such an argument could be resisted by pointing out that one impor-
tant reason for having a biobanking ethics in the first place is surely to
limit the potential risk of ignoring individual rights and autonomy in
pursuit of greater goods.) Rather, it is that the collection of large quan-
tities of genetic data and the use to which biobanking puts it necessa-
rily gives rise to an ethical subject that comprises more than one
individual. Thus whilst individual autonomy remains a key ethical con-
cern, it is found wanting as the overarching ethical framework for
biobanking.
2. Moving on from Informed Consent
Broad Consent
Summarizing the problems outlined in the last section – genetic mate-
rial containing information about people other than the donor and the
open-endedness of biobank projects – the basic problem is that of what
exactly the individual donor is consenting to by participating in a
biobank. Donating material to a database of a mass of genetic infor-
mation that may be used in comparative studies, as well as population
or generational ones means that consent becomes harder to inform in
the relevant autonomy-respecting sense. One way round this particu-
lar problem is to move to a condition of general or ‘broad’ consent
where, given the nature of the biobanking projects one is participating
in, the donor consents to the ‘multiple purposes of biomedical research
and future consent to as yet unspecified biomedical research’ (Hannson
et al., 2006, 266). Here it could be argued that, as long as the infor-
mation about those purposes and that research is properly communi-
cated and understood by the individual donor, the consent given is as
fully informed as such a project requires and will allow.
A problem with this broad consent model concerns whether the con-
sent given is in effect permission to do anything the recipient biobank
sees fit with genetic material. Whilst it has been suggested that broad
consent ‘can be seen as a means of maximising autonomy’ (McHale,
2006, 196) in the biobanking context, it could be taken to be its oppo-
site: a wholesale abrogation of individual autonomy, particularly with
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respect to the knowledge of the materials and information’s future
usage. The worry here is that in giving broad consent, the donor is
being informed of little more than the fact that they have relinquished
the access to knowledge about its future usage. Actual models of broad
consent have sought to assuage this concern; for example the UK
Human Tissue Act (2004) maintains the right of the donor to withdraw
their sample at any time, and recommends that they be updated with
any significant change of the purpose to which material may be put,
for example ‘if their samples will or could be used for research invol-
ving the commercial sector’ (2004, para. 80).
With these kinds of caveats in place, the attractiveness of broad con-
sent is that it recognizes both the importance of donors’ agreement and
understanding – as far as possible – what they are agreeing to, and
that it is inappropriate to expect donors to biobanking research to be in-
formed about every possible and future specific use of their genetic ma-
terials. But by the same token it highlights the urgency of something
already alluded to, namely that the purposes and aims of biobanks and
their projects are clear and that they are communicated effectively to
donors. Broad or general consent may be appropriate in the bioban-
king case, but if it is not to be ‘blind’ or ‘carte blanche’ consent
(Maschke, 2006, 193), then it too has to be well-informed if it is to im-
prove on the previous consent model. Where the specifics of a single
clinical research programme are replaced with more generally stated
aims, purposes and rationales, the latter need to be formulated to re-
searchers and subjects just as clearly as the former (or perhaps even
more clearly, given that they warrant a much wider range of possibili-
ties). ‘General’, in this context, should not mean vague, protean or
unintelligible.
Accordingly, neither informed consent nor broad consent is sufficient to
respect the ethically significant features of the public and donors in re-
lation to biobanking. Problems, such as the need to address the
ongoing nature of the research and the rights and interests of third par-
ties, have led ethicists to seek new models which attempt to address
such concerns. In the rest of the paper we will explore three such mo-
dels; the first and second are the ‘shareholder’ model and the ‘stake-
holder’ model which broadly fit under the category of ‘trust models’ (or
possibly conditional gift models) in that they both involve initial broad
consent supplemented by additional ethical and governance frame-
works; the third is an institutional alternative which begins with the
proper function of biobanks and presents the biobank itself as the ethi-
cal subject.
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The Shareholder Model
Empirically, the importance of subjects’ faith in biobanking institutions
and professionals to adhere to their aims and purposes in the right way
has been underlined in a study of a Norwegian focus group of biobank
participants which found that ‘consenters base their participation on
trust in the researchers and the regulation of research in Norwegian
society, rather than on specific information on the research in question’
(Skolbekken et al., 2005, 335). Key to successful biobanking is the
need to establish and maintain trust: in establishing a biobanking
ethics, ‘process and trust matter’ (Skolbekken et al., 2005, 335). In
other words the workings and ethos of the biobank and related projects
and institutions need to be visible, reliable and commensurate with the
donors’ wishes to an extent that justifies their participating and con-
senting.
In view of this requirement, a view of the biobanking project as a kind
of cooperative scheme has been employed as a model of biobanking
ethics: the ‘trust model’ or ‘conditional gift’ are the two terms most
often used in the literature for this type of conception. We can see in
this approach the potential for fostering the confidence which is re-
quired by donors mentioned in the last paragraph. In the trust models,
additional ethics and governance mechanisms are introduced to sup-
plement consent, and to ensure that the samples are used in accord
with the expectation of the donor and with the conditions on the origi-
nal consent. In the trust model “when a person agrees to donate tissue,
the recipient has a responsibility to serve as a trustee, or steward, of
the tissue in order to ensure protection of the contribution”. (Winickoff
and Winickoff, 2003, 1182).
One version of the trust model formulated by David E. Winickoff iden-
tifies this relationship as a partnership of shareholders. Concerned to
reflect the breadth of communities and individuals involved in bioban-
king projects, Winickoff advocates ‘developing representational forms
for the donor collective in biobanking’ (Winickoff, 2007, 451). For
Winickoff, a problem to be addressed here, is an ‘agency gap’ between
the donor collective who give their biological and informational mate-
rial for research, and those who manage and oversee biobanks (Winick-
off, 2007, 450). This gap, he suggests, could be bridged by – among
other things – the formation of donors’ voluntary associations who
would elect representatives who could sit on the board of directors and
take places in any relevant Ethical advisory or regulatory bodies. More-
over, Winickoff thinks that this strategy ‘may work towards solving the
well documented trust problem’ and will be required if ‘the social proj-
ect of biobanking is to move forward fairly and sustainably’(Winickoff,
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2007, 452).
What this proposal, based on a corporate shareholder model, offers
then, is a significant move away from the focus on the individual and
their autonomy. Instead, the framework it recommends is concerned
with constructing a biobank in a certain kind of way so as to further its
stated rationale as a social and cooperative venture. In so doing, the
shareholder conception goes some way towards a substantial template
that can provide the visibility and reliability conditions crucial to in-
forming donors’ general consent. Thus the problem of providing ade-
quate but broad consent might be addressed in the process of solving
what Winickoff refers to as the ‘trust problem’.
The Stakeholder Approach
Whilst the shareholder strategy encompasses the donor collective and
urges their participation in shaping the ethical conduct of the biobank
to which they ‘belong’, objections have been raised to the shareholder
model as a way of conceptualizing and applying the cooperative scheme
idea. The idea of participants as stakeholders is that their interests are
represented and heard among those of, for example medical re-
searchers and managers, and that all participants shape the way
biobanking is carried and out and regulated. Hence the framework of
biobanking ethics, on this view, becomes the actual ongoing delibera-
tion involving all those involved in the project, or representatives
thereof. Among some other criticisms, however, Kathryn Hunter and
Graeme Laurie have seen in the shareholder strategy:
a danger that vocal minorities might come to dominate within the shareholder
model, especially if connected to groups that are already well-organised, re-
sourced and mobilised (e.g. patient or advocacy groups) and which have strong
preconceived and fixed preferences about the use of the resource and/or the
distribution of resources. It might also lead to a presumption that a model of
representation is truly representative and that no further engagement is re-
quired.
(Hunter and Laurie, 2009, 158-9).
One way of developing this worry a bit further is to say that the ‘gap’ between
parties involved in biobanking highlighted by Winickoff may actually be re-
produced and multiplied by positing more and more agencies in the struc-
ture of biobank regulation. Here the problem can be taken as an instance of
a more general one about factions and particular interests. Why, to use
Winickoff’s proposed example, does an association representing donors’ in-
terests fill a gap between their perceived interests and those of managers,
when it could just as easily isolate and particularize those interests in oppo-
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sition to those of other groups within the organization? Put most forcefully
‘[t]he ‘shareholder’ analogy envisions not ‘partnership’ or ‘co-operation’ but,
rather, self-interest and control’ (Hunter and Laurie, 2009, 164).
In light of this worry, and others, about the efficacy of the shareholder
model, Hunter and Laurie suggest that a ‘stakeholder’ model is more
appropriate to biobanking ethics and governance. They argue for a far
broader inclusion of interested parties that goes beyond participants
and which ‘would include (among others) participants such as the board
of directors, ethics committees; funders and members of the company;
researchers; communities; the wider public or society and, most im-
portantly in contrast to the ‘stakeholder model’, ‘future generations
whose health the resource is intended to improve’ (Hunter and Laurie,
2009, 170).
The main strength of the stakeholder view can perhaps be brought out
by considering once again the inadequacy and inappropriateness of
subjects’ consent as the basis of a biobanking ethics. We have seen
that by its defining practices and projects, biobanking transactions be-
tween individuals and researchers and institutions involve many more
people, groups and communities than an ethics of individual autonomy
addresses. Hunter and Laurie’s vision of biobanking ethics and gover-
nance is of a participatory scheme that encompasses this scope, main-
taining and expanding on the insights of the shareholder model whilst
improving on its restriction to participants as akin to shareholders in a
corporation.
An obvious concern with the stakeholder approach, acknowledged to
some extent by its proponents Hunter and Laurie (2009, 171), is that
by rightly recognizing the breadth of the cohort of relevant ‘stake-
holders’, it thus concludes that all and any individuals within a society
are or could be legitimate stakeholders, and that whilst this conclusion
may be conceptually persuasive, the actual problem of how to include
all these stakeholders is arguably no more tangible than the problems
of how to run a political society. We might add that ongoing biobanking
research is certainly not restricted by national boundaries, and that
therefore this difficulty of inclusion does not stop at geographical or po-
litical borders.
Perhaps one insight of the stakeholder model is that it highlights both
the necessary breadth of an appropriate biobanking ethical framework
and the practical difficulties of constructing an adequate version.
However, whilst the stakeholder approach is largely a case for properly
accommodating the correct range of public interests in biobanking
ethics, Hunter and Laurie do suggest ways in which to take on the prac-
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tical problem that reflect this, for example through regular public mee-
tings and publication of their proceedings.7 These practices at least re-
flect the stakeholder rationale of consultation and dialogue in the
pursuit of properly informed participants and beneficiaries.
3. The Biobank as Ethical Subject
A third proposed ethical framework for biobanking differs from both the
focus on individual consent and the trust model. The basic idea dis-
cussed in this section is that the biobanking institution, like others, can
be seen as an ethical subject we can judge to be operating in better or
worse ways according to how well or badly it fulfils its function: in short,
the ‘fit for purpose’ biobank as the subject of biobanking ethics. In this
section we outline the basis of the functional view, then discuss its ap-
plication to biobanking in particular and end by considering ways in
which it could come at some of the specific problems raised in this
paper.
The Institutional Ergon
The notion of an institution such as a biobank functioning as it should
is based on an institution being a good or bad instance of its kind, just
as we might say of a pen or a knife that a ‘good pen’ writes well or that
a ‘good knife’ cuts well. This approach sees the function of an institu-
tion as its ‘characteristic activity’ – in Aristotelian terms the ergon – of
a particular institution that makes it what it is. (Foot, 1978, 135) Two
thoughts underlie this functional view. Firstly, a social institution is de-
fined by its function: it consists in a certain collective human activity or
clusters of activities, and this activity or these activities account for
what it is. Consider that it seems impossible to characterize a social
institution without referring to a collective social activity: a social insti-
tution is what it does. Secondly, institutions are in the relevant sense
artificial in the sense that they are made, by persons, for some
purpose.
On this way of thinking, the institutional ergon is not only descriptive
but also evaluative and normative. That is, consistent with how it
figures elsewhere (Aristotle, 2001, 1097b22-118), the conception of
ergon as applied to an institution relates not merely (or necessarily) to
what an institution happens to be doing, but also to what it should do.
This might be more intuitive than it first appears when we consider the
ways in which institutions can fail to be ‘good institutions’. Think of
‘institutional racism’8 or, more recently, investment banks’ fatally
reckless gambling with customers’ money. These are cases of institu-
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tions themselves subverting the putative practice which they suppos-
edly embody: failing justly to protect and serve a community and
having little or nothing to do with good financial practices respectively.
In terms of determining what the ergon of an institution is, one imme-
diate problem here is that the purpose of an institution may not be
transparent either from an observation of its current or past activities
(it may be a poor instance of its kind); or from studying mission state-
ments, constitutions or policies (these may fail to ‘track’ the proper
ergon or they may not be being enacted by the institution).9 In re-
sponse, thinking about what would be sought and agreed upon by ra-
tional people were these institutions not in existence (security in the
case of legal institutions, health in medical institutions etc.) might point
to the essential features of institutions that transcend such contingent
possibilities.
Developing this thought towards an account of the particular substan-
tive qualities of a good institution, the ‘hypothetical contract’ model just
mentioned, together with the consideration that institutions are
constructed by humans for a purpose, shows up the crucial connection
between any social institution and some specific human good or goods.
That is, if there are good reasons for rational persons to establish, pro-
mote and maintain a socially constructed institution, whatever form it
may take at whichever stage in its history, then those reasons are
linked to some human good or goods. Accordingly, the current concep-
tion of institutional ergon can be characterized by a pair of necessary
and jointly sufficient conditions. One is that an institution serves its pri-
mary, nominal, purpose and the other is that by doing so it substan-
tiates some and distinctive key human good or set of goods. This links
the particular human goods of education, or law or health, to the
functions of educational, legal or healthcare institutions. These are the
human goods that figure specifically in an explanation of their exis-
tence.
The Ergon of the Biobanking Institution
What then is the ergon of a biobank construed in this sense? Most
obviously its goods are those of research and the discovery of knowl-
edge in conjunction with human health and disease prevention. But
more particular consideration of the way in which the biobank concerns
a certain conjunction of goods gives us a more distinctive grip on its
characteristic activity – ergon. That is, other kinds of institution such as
universities do medical research and are essentially concerned with
knowledge and research, whilst hospitals and healthcare institutions
are linked essentially to health. The biobanks’ defining modus operandi
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is in its combination of these goods oriented in a specific way by its
purpose of large scale data collection.
Finally then, how might this conception do ethical work in the sense re-
quired by a biobanking ethical framework? Whilst the idea of institu-
tional ergon does not require that an institution be a ‘collective person’,
with all the problematic metaphysical baggage that may bring, it does
in a sense see the institution as an ethical quasi-agent that operates in
certain ways – and can be evaluated and directed accordingly. When we
understand the human artificial nature of an institution and thus what
‘better or worse’ means in terms of its institutional excellences and
ethos, we can instructively view institutions as at least analogous to
persons with virtues and character.
More specifically for our purposes, can such a conception address the
particular issues for biobanking raised in this paper? As to policy for-
mulation and ethical regulation, the human goods conception of ergon
could plug a gap between contingent facts about the biobank as it hap-
pens to be; and the nominal or primary purpose of biobank research
which may be interpreted in a number of ways. This is particularly im-
portant when we consider that biobanking ethics as a sub-discipline of
ethics is as yet ongoing and being defined. For here is the possibility of
something to refer to which goes beyond appeal to extant or previous
practices and can transcend the perspectives of private interests. For
example in debating the question of whether to allow a particular com-
mercial venture to make use of the biobank, which may or may not be
disallowed outright by a particular code of practice and about which ex-
plicit mission statements may be vague, the conception of ergon could
be evoked as criteria to decide whether such a project fits with the
ergon understood properly in the human goods sense. The claim here
is not that this conception will alone answer decisively either way in
every case, but that it can provide some objective ethical leverage in
ethical debates over such procedures. Similarly regarding the ‘agency
gap’, the hope here is that a richer understanding of purpose and aims
of a biobank with which all participants are properly acquainted, could
at least justify certain expectations of biobanking as reasonable and
challenge others as not in keeping with its ergon. Accordingly, then, it
could offer to provide or supplement the kind of information about pur-
poses that is required to be understood and communicated to donors
as meaningfully broad consent.
4. Conclusion
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To summarize, we have surveyed and assessed some actual and possi-
ble developments in biobanking ethics. Whilst the principle of auto-
nomy and the informed consent condition embody and stem historically
from a proper ethical concern for individual donors in their relation to
research projects, and whilst a quite general bioethical principle or set
of principles that strongly prioritizes individual personal autonomy may
be apt for and may rightly constrain certain research activities, it is ill
suited in these respects to biobanking projects designed to build data-
bases of information about the genetic tendencies of whole populations
and future generations. In light of the failure of informed consent, we
then discussed some alternatives, firstly one way in which the consent
condition has been modified, and then an expansion of biobanking
ethics away from the focus on individual autonomy and towards a con-
ception of the biobank as a cooperative scheme or trust. A further
suggestion was made regarding the role of biobanking function as eth-
ical criterion, and of the biobank as an ethical subject by itself.
In conclusion; the adherence to informed consent on the liberal-indi-
vidual model is unsatisfactory as the basis of biobanking ethics, though
this is not to obviate donor consent as an important ethical concern
which is dealt with more adequately by broad consent. However, even
properly informed broad consent is alone insufficient to cover all the
relevant ethical ground in biobanking: donor consent is one ethical
issue, and the donor is one ethical subject, among many others. This is
highlighted by the more communally based approaches of Winickoff and
Hunter and Laurie, and we hope to have offered a further institutional
direction with the function – ergon – model. It is hoped that by doing
so, this paper has suggested at least an appropriate kind of ethical
framework for biobanking and some ways in which it could best be
developed.
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Notes
1. This disconnection between donated material and bodily harm may not be obvious in the
case of certain bodily materials and the reasons for their storage. As exemplified by the
case in which six men had their sperm stored for future use whilst they underwent treat-
ment for cancer (Yearworth and ors., 2009) and the NHS trust responsible for storing inad-
vertently destroyed the sperm. Arguably the men were harmed by the omission of the NHS
to do what they should, as a physical capability – for procreation – which depended on the
correct conditions for storage being maintained was destroyed by their negligence.
2. In a famous case, for example, Leukaemia patient John Moore’s cancer was developed into
a lucrative cell-line using bodily materials taken from Moore in the course of treatment.
Though the part of Moore’s lawsuit which claimed that a property conversion had taken place
– and thus that he was entitled to a share of subsequent economic benefits accrued from
the patenting – failed, appeal judges concurred that Moore nevertheless had ‘a cause of ac-
tion for breach of fiduciary duty or lack of informed consent’ (1990).
3. For a different argument against the priority of autonomy in medical ethics see Oakley and
Cocking Virtue Ethics and Professional Roles.
4. See Beauchamps and Childress (1979) and Widdows (2007b).
5. For a classic defence of this view see Bradley (1927, p.166 ff.) See also Widdows (2007a.).
6. For the view that such relations are not necessary for autonomous persons see Holroyd
(2009).
7. Hunter and Laurie suggest that their approach is already embryonic, and could be developed,
in actual biobanking contexts. An example they cite is the EGC (Ethics and Governance
Council) of UK Biobank, which ‘has produced documentation that explores and explains its
approach to “advising in the public interest” ’ as well as holding regular public meetings at
which lists of ‘Frequently Asked Questions’ are drawn up and made available on its website
(Hunter and Laurie 2009, p.175).
8. The term ‘institutional racism’ came to the fore in the MacPherson inquiry into the Metro-
politan Police Force’s investigation and handling of case of the murder of black teenager
Stephen Lawrence in 1993.
9. Another objection that might be raised concerns whether evil institutions can have an ergon-
such that they could be functioning well but doing bad things: examples include criminal
gangs or organs of violently oppressive regimes. This conception of ergon can readily accept
this without having to claim that such institutions should be functioning at all. Moreover, in
some cases the ergon conception can also do some work in determining which institutions
we have reason to change or dismantle, and if so why. When wading through the populist
bluster of a political party, pressure group, or newspaper in order to establish what it is re-
ally about, for example, its deep seated racism or sexism will often be rooted in its concern
for the narrowly understood goods of one group of persons at the cost of another. So, to find
out what makes some institution function ‘properly’, as a thing of its kind, can be to find out
that it is unjust, pernicious or vicious.
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